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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-The Effect of State
Constitutional Interpretation on New Mexico's Civil and
Criminal Procedure-State v. Gomez
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Gomez,' the New Mexico Supreme Court formally adopted the
interstitial approach to state constitutional interpretation.2 Under this approach, the
court first examines an individual's claim to protection under the United States
Constitution. If the federal claim fails, the court will then determine if the state
constitution supplements or amplifies the right in question. After engaging in this
analysis, the Gomez court held that the New Mexico Constitution affords broader
protection to individuals in the realm of automobile searches under Article II,
Section 10 than is provided by the United States Constitution under the Fourth
Amendment. 3 Thus, New Mexico rejected the federal bright-line auto exception to
the warrant requirement: A warrantless search of an automobile, and of containers
found within automobiles, now requires a showing of a reasonable belief that
exigent circumstances 4 existed in order to be justified.5 Furthermore, preserving a
state constitutional issue for appeal is dependent upon current New Mexico
precedent which construes the constitutional provision in question; a party need not
specifically cite cases which give rise to a more expansive interpretation of the right
asserted under state law than under federal precedent.6
This Note will analyze the various theoretical approaches to state constitutional
interpretation and their respective impact on practitioners. It will then proceed to
explore the evolution of the appellate preservation rule and the development of
federal and New Mexico search and seizure law. This Note should demonstrate how
the decision to adopt the interstitial approach has affected both civil and criminal
procedure in New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the evening of June 13, 1994, Lea County Deputy Sheriff Payne was
dispatched to a "party disturbance" near Lovington, New Mexico.' At the scene,
approximately fifty to sixty people were congregated around cars parked along both
sides of a dirt road. As Payne approached the car of Alfredo Gomez (defendant),
someone yelled "The cops!". Gomez began to move frantically about inside the car
and Payne "heard the sound of a tin container being shut and saw Gomez furtively
stuff something under the front seat." Both Gomez and Payne exited their respective
cars at the same time and Payne grabbed Gomez's car door as Gomez attempted to

1. 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1(1997).
2. See id. at 783, 932 P.2d at 7.
3. See id. at787-88,932P.2dat 11-12.

4. "Exigent circumstances means an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger
to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence."
State v. Copeland, 105 N.M. 27, 31, 727 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 702, 726 P.2d 856
(1986) (citing State v. Chavez, 98 N.M. 61, 644 P.2d 1050 (Ct. App. 1982)).
5. See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 788, 932 P.2d at 12.
6. See id. at 782, 932 P.2d at 6.
7. See id.
at 780,932 P.2d at 4. Unless otherwise cited, all subsequent references to the facts of this case
refer to Gomez, 122 N.M. at 779-81, 932 P.2d at 3-5.
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shut it. Smelling the odor of marijuana, Payne arrested Gomez and secured him in
the patrol car.
By this time, additional officers had arrived on the scene and, looking through
the window of Gomez's car, Payne observed marijuana scattered on the console,
seat, and floorboard. Payne also saw items commonly used for smoking marijuana:
a brass pipe and a pair of hemostats. Deputy Sheriff Payne then opened the door and
searched the car's interior. As a result of this warrantless search, Payne found a tin
container and a fanny pack filled with tabs of white paper and small "baggies."
Payne seized these items, which were later introduced at trial against Gomez as
evidence of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) possession.
At trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the evidence found in the car. The
defense argued the evidence was seized by Payne in the midst of conducting a
warrantless search of Gomez's automobile and that exigent circumstances were not
present.8 The State argued that probable cause alone justifies searching a movable
vehicle and its closed containers.9 Although the defense asserted there was
precedent in New Mexico requiring a showing of exigent circumstances, the trial
court denied the motion to suppress and concluded that with the marijuana and
paraphernalia in plain view, Payne had probable cause to search the entire vehicle.'0
Gomez appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. However, that court
refused to review Gomez's claim that Article H, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution affords him broader protection than the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution." The court held that the claim was not properly
preserved because Gomez did not mention the state constitution at trial nor did he
articulate specific arguments why it may be interpreted to afford greater protection
under the circumstances of his case.12
The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed in part and held that the trial court
should have been alerted to the broader protection issue. 3 By invoking the principle
of exigency previously recognized under the state constitution and by developing
the facts needed for a ruling on that question, Gomez met the preservation
requirements of Rule 12-216(A). 4 The court formally adopted the interstitial
approach to state constitutional interpretation and held that, in New Mexico a
warrantless search of an automobile, and of containers found within the auto, is
only justified if the State shows reasonable grounds for the officer's belief that
exigent circumstances existed. 5 Nonetheless, this watermark decision did not help

8. See id. at 779,932 P.2d at 3.
9. See id. at 781, 932 P.2d at 5. The State invoked United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), State v.
Pena, 108 N.M. 760 (1989). and State v. Apodaca, 112 N.M. 302, 814 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112
N.M. 220, 813 P.2d 1018 (1991), in support of its proposition that the warrant requirement does not apply to
movable automobiles and closed containers found within. The court correctly noted that these cases were decided
under the lock-step analysis, a state constitutional interpretation approach, which New Mexico now rejects. See
id. at 787, 932 P.2d at 11.
10. See id. at 779,932 P.2d at 3.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 784,932 P.2d at 8.
14. See id. See also N.M. R. APP. P. 12-216(A) (mandating that to preserve an issue for appellate review
a ruling or decision by the trial court must have been fairly invoked).
15. See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 788, 932 P.2d at 12.
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Mr. Gomez. Finding it was reasonable for Deputy Sheriff Payne to believe that
exigent circumstances called for an immediate search of the automobile, the
Supreme Court affirmed Gomez's conviction. 6
III. APPROACH TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Historicaland Contextual Background
Throughout most of our nation's history, state constitutional provisions have
provided the sole source of protection against governmental intrusion into our civil
liberties. Thus, the federal Bill of Rights was originally construed to apply against
federal action only. Then, during the 1960s, the Warren Court incorporated
selective provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment and began
to use the federal Constitution as a regulator of all governmental intervention in
citizens' lives. Several expansionist rulings by the Warren Court turned the United
States Constitution into the primary tool for safeguarding individual rights. 17 It was
generally assumed that state constitutions provided no greater protection than that
afforded by Supreme Court interpretations of federal liberty guarantees; therefore,
state constitutional law fell dormant."8
Concurrent with the Burger and Rehnquist Court's attempts to scale back on
individual rights, there has been a reawakening of state constitutional
jurisprudence. 9 This growing trend, dubbed the "new federalism" movement, was
spurred on in part by dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall in which
they encouraged state courts to independently examine their own state constitutional
provisions.2 ° Thus, states increasingly resort to their own law when federal
guarantees prove inadequate protection against governmental intrusion. There are
four primary theoretical approaches that state courts utilize when engaging in state
constitutional interpretation: lock-step; primacy; interstitial; and dual sovereignty.
The particular approach employed may determine the vitality of the state's
constitutional jurisprudence and precisely how a litigator should present a state
constitutional claim before the state judiciary.
A.

1. Lock-Step
State courts following the lock-step approach do not engage in independent
analysis of their state constitution. Instead, where a state constitutional provision
has a federal analog, lock-step jurisdictions will adopt the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the individual right in question as their own. Their theoretical
framework embodies a mirroring presumption: the content of a state constitutional
right is assumed to "mirror" the content of any corresponding federal guarantee,

16. See id. at 789, 932 P.2d at 13. Apparently, the situation was deemed exigent in part due to the crowd
of onlookers.
17. See John W. Shaw, Comment, Principled Interpretations of State Constitutional Law-Why Don't the
"Primacy" States Practice What They Preach?, 54 U. Prrr.L REV. 1019 (1993).
18. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 2.10, at 94 (2d ed. 1992).
19. See id. See also Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitier, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument:
Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L REv. 635, 636-38 (1987).
20. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 19, at 638.
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regardless of textual or historical differences between the two documents. If a
federal provision does not provide an individual with protection against a
governmental intrusion, the state constitution will not be independently scrutinized.
States which apply the lock-step method do so out of a self-imposed compulsion to
keep their interpretation of the breadth of state constitutional rights in line with
Supreme Court analysis of analogous federal rights.
The lock-step approach has attracted numerous critics. States following this
method do a disservice to the concept of federalism because lock-step does not
recognize that the American system of government is composed of more than one
sovereign. "[A]bsolute deference violates a state judge's duty to independently
interpret the scope of the state constitution."22 Another inherent and unavoidable
danger of the lock-step model is that state constitutional jurisprudence will never
be fully developed. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan emphasized that "state
courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the
federal Constitution. State Constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law." 22 Thus, states following the lock-step approach
arguably abrogate the obligation the state judiciary owes to its own citizens to
uphold and independently interpret the state constitution.2 3
2. Primacy
The primacy model is the antithesis of lock-step. States which have adopted this
approach (including Oregon, Washington, Maine, and New Hampshire) endow their
state constitutional provisions with a totally independent reading. "The primacy
approach views state constitutions as the primary sources of individual rights, with
the U.S. Constitution providing a second layer of protection."' In keeping with this
theory, the methodology employed is to first examine and interpret the state
provision.25 If the right is protected, the federal Constitution need not be examined
at all.26 Primacy courts will turn to the federal Constitution only if the state
constitution fails to support the defendant's claim. 7 "Courts using this approach do
not consider federal law and analysis presumptively valid, viewing them instead as
no more persuasive than decisions of sister state supreme courts. 2 8
Primacy appears to be one of the more polemic approaches to state constitutional
interpretation-attracting vocal supporters and critics alike. Primacy advocates
emphasize that this methodology is truest to our governmental system in which
states have sovereign powers 29 and it best reflects prevalent attitudes amongst the

21. d. at 646.
22. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L REV.
489, 491 (1977).
23. See Utter & Piter, supra note 19, at 645.
24. Shaw, supra note 17, at 1025.
25. See Utter & Pitier, supra note 19, at 647.
26. See id.
27. See Shaw, supranote 17, at 1025-26.
28. Utter & Pitler, supranote 19, at 647.
29. See Linda White Atkins, Note, Federalism, Uniformity, and the State Constitution-State v. Gunwall,
62 WASH. L REV. 569, 574 (1987).
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state's citizenry.3 Since the state constitution is always examined, primacy
advances the growth of state constitutional jurisprudence. It may also be considered
the most efficient approach in many respects. Primacy courts are able to preserve
judicial resources because time is not spent unnecessarily addressing additional
claims if the case can be resolved under state law.3 In addition, primacy promotes
efficiency because state courts employing the primacy methodology can effectively
avoid reversal on appeal, since it is clear their cases are decided on the basis of state
grounds alone.32 This also serves to reduce the United States Supreme Court's
caseload, thus creating a more efficient judicial system as a whole.
On the other hand, opponents argue that basing a decision solely on state grounds
is essentially an undemocratic attempt to avoid federal scrutiny. Primacy critics also
point out that primacy diminishes the amount of state court commentary on federal
law. Although that decrease may be viewed as preserving judicial resources, on the
negative side, the lack of input from state judges reduces the state's role in
developing federal jurisprudence. 3 Furthermore, critics charge that the
methodology employed by primacy courts ignores the need for national uniformity
as a factor in decision-making (although the relative importance of this point is
debatable).
3. Interstitial
The interstitial approach has been lauded as a methodology that "reflects the
modem role of the U.S. Constitution as the 'basic protector of fundamental
liberties,' while allowing states the opportunity to supplement the minimum
protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution."35 In accordance with this view,
interstitial jurisdictions first address the federal constitutional issue.36 If the state
court finds the governmental action in question violates the United States
Constitution as interpreted by the federal judiciary, it will not engage in
independent analysis of the analogous state constitutional provision.37 The state
constitutional issue is only reached if the federal Constitution does not recognize
the individual's claim as a protected right.3"
In contrast to primacy, federal precedent is considered highly persuasive and
presumptively correct; however, in contrast to lock-step, federal precedent is not
binding upon state constitutional interpretation.39 While this deference to the federal
analysis can be overcome, most state courts employing the interstitial model will
not deviate from federal precedent unless litigants can expressly justify the

30. See Shaw, supra note 17, at 1027-28.
31. Seeid. at1027.
32. See id.
33. See Utter & Piter, supra note 19, at 648.
34. See id.
35. Shaw, supra note 17, at 1028 (citing Stewart J.Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of
Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L REv. 707, 718 (1983)).
36. See State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 783, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (citing Developments in the Law-The
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv.L REv. 1324, 1358 (1982)).
37. See id.
38. See id. See also Shaw, supra note 17, at 1028.
39. See Utter & Piter, supra note 19, at 648-49.
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deviation by referring to specified criteria which demonstrates that the state and
federal provisions have different meanings.
Some commentators have suggested that the interstitial model impedes
development of state constitutional law because the tendency may be to interpret
state provisions in conformity with the federal analysis.' Moreover, the possibility
of reversal on appeal is an ever-present danger in jurisdictions relying on the
interstitial methodology.4" Since federal law is always analyzed under this approach,
state courts must be vigilant in declaring that their opinions which diverge from
federal precedent are based on "adequate and independent state grounds."'42
4. Dual Sovereignty
Under the dual sovereignty view of federalism, both the state and the federal
constitutions provide independent and equivalent sources of individual rights. 43
Consistent with this notion, the dual sovereignty methodology mandates an
examination of both sources in every case. States following the dual sovereignty
approach may begin their analysis with either source. Regardless of the order of
analysis, the state law will always be examined, "even if the defendant's challenge
would succeed, in the court's opinion, on federal grounds alone." Dual sovereignty
respects the integrity of the federalist system: it acknowledges the Supreme Court's
view of what is and is not appropriate for protection nationally, while it develops
a body of state constitutional law that recognizes distinctions and the value of
experimentation. However, the primary benefit of this approach may very well be
45
that dual sovereignty jurisdictions fulfill the requirements of Michigan v. Long,
thus insulating their decisions from potential Supreme Court review and reversal.
From a different standpoint, this seemingly positive aspect of dual sovereignty
can be considered an impediment to the democratic process. This is so because
courts that base their judgments on both the state and federal constitutions escape
federal judicial review and, at the state level, inhibit legislative initiatives to modify
unpopular decisions in accord with popular attitudes.' In addition, dual sovereignty
could be criticized for violating the legal principle of deciding cases narrowly. Since
both documents are analyzed, even if the law of one would suffice, the court is
forced to engage in writing dicta. Although the additional commentary may be
useful in helping to develop federal jurisprudence, it is an inefficient and
impractical use of judicial resources.

40. See id. at 650-51
41. See id.
42. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). The Supreme Court stated: "If the state court decision
indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision." Id. at 1040-41.
43. See Shaw, supra note 17, at 1028-29.
44. Shirley S. Abrahamson, CriminalLaw and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional
Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1171 (1985).
45. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Michigan v. Long holds that state decisions clearly based on adequate and
independent state grounds will not be subject to federal review. See id. at 1040-41.
46. See George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-JudicialReview Under
the CaliforniaConstitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 975, 996-99 (1979).
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B.

New Mexico's Adoption of the InterstitialApproach
Since statehood, the New Mexico Constitution has traditionally been interpreted
in lock-step with the federal Constitution. Not until the 1976 decision of State ex
rel. Serna v. Hodges47 did New Mexico pronounce its sovereign right to
independently scrutinize its state constitution. However, state constitutional
provisions were not construed any more broadly than Supreme Court interpretations
of similar federal guarantees until a 1989 decision rejecting the federal "totality of
the circumstances" test for probable cause." Since then, in the realm of search and
seizure law, the New Mexico judiciary has often found Article IH,
Section 10 of the
state constitution fertile ground for extending protection to individuals beyond the
level provided by its federal counterpart, the Fourth Amendment.49 This is true
despite the identical language of the two provisions. In arriving at these decisions,
New Mexico tacitly employed the interstitial approach, resorting to the state
constitution only after finding the federal analysis unpersuasive.' However, it was
not until Gomez that the New Mexico Supreme Court formally pronounced that it
was adopting the interstitial method of state constitutional interpretation. 5'
Since lock-step had previously been discarded as an inappropriate approach for
a federalist system, 2 in deciding Gomez the New Mexico Supreme Court
conceptua-lized its choice as one between the interstitial approach and primacy."
The court did not explore, nor did it even give lip service to, the advantages and
disadvantages of adopting the dual-sovereignty methodology. The court backed up
its preference for the interstitial method by citing to scholarly and judicial
commentary emphasizing the importance of preserving national uniformity.'M The
Gomez opinion quotes a passage from a New Jersey case, State v. Hunt,5 which is
instructive regarding the particular concerns of the New Mexico Supreme Court.
The main points emphasize that: "cooperation must exist in a truly effective
federalist system"; "some consistency and uniformity between state and federal
governments in certain areas of judicial administration is desirable"; and "state

47. 89 N.M. 351, 356,552 P.2d 787, 792 (1976), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Rondeau,
81 N.M. 408,412, 553 P.2d 688, 692 (1976).
48. See Shannon Oliver, Note, Refusing to "Turn the Other Cheek"--New Mexico Rejects Federal "Good
Faith" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: State v. Gutierrez, 24 N.M. L REV. 545, 552 (1994) (discussing State
v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211,784 P.2d 30 (1989)).
49. See Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994) (Campos ILrev'g State v. Campos, 113 N.M.

421,827 P.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1991) (Campos (finding exigent circumstances are required for warrantless arrests
in New Mexico); State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141,870 P.2d 103 (1994); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431,863 P.2d
1052 (1993) (rejecting federal "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule); State v. Wright, 119 N.M. 559, 893
P.2d 455 (Ct. App.1995). See also Kathleen M. Wilson, Note, State Constitutional Law-New Mexico Rejects
Apparent Authority to Consent as a Valid Basis for Warrantless Searches: State v. Wright, 26 N.M. L REV. 571,
579 (1996).
50. See State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 783, 932 P.2d 1,7 (1997) (discussing reasons for finding federal
analysis unpersuasive: perceived flaw; distinctive state characteristics; undeveloped area of federal law).
51. See id.
52. See Hodges, 89 N.M. at 356, 552 P.2d at 792.
53. See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 783, 932 P.2d at 7 ("We today specifically adopt the interstitial in preference
to the primacy approach .....
54. See id.
55. 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
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courts should be sensitive to developments in federal law."56 The interstitial
approach permits independent state analysis when necessary, yet it does not require
separate analysis in cases where the court agrees with federal precedent. When the
federal analysis is reasoned and articulate, New Mexico sees no reason to "reinvent
the wheel."57 The Gomez court held that, under the interstitial method, the New
Mexico judiciary may diverge from federal precedent under any one of the
following circumstances: 1) when the federal analysis is deemed flawed, thus
unpersuasive; 2) when there are distinctive state characteristics which call for a
different approach; 3) when structural differences are apparent between state and
federal government; or 4) when the federal analog has not yet been developed.5"
Analysis and Implications
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision to officially adopt an approach to
state constitutional interpretation should be applauded. It should provide numerous
benefits, such as encouraging litigators to present state constitutional claims and not
to simply rely upon federal precedent. In this respect, it will promote the
development of a sound body of state constitutional jurisprudence. Furthermore,
adopting a particular methodology should lead to consistent, predictable, and
reasonable state court decision-making. Employing one approach "theoretically
remov[es] the opportunity for the judiciaries to arbitrarily apply state constitutional
provisions."5 9 Another vital consideration is that the failure to adopt a particular
approach opens the state court to criticism that its judgments are result-oriented
(because outcomes could potentially be manipulated by choosing different
approaches to address different issues).
The court's decision to specifically choose the interstitial approach over the other
alternatives may provoke controversy within the state, but it is also commendable.
New Mexico Supreme Court Chief Justice Franchini stated in a speech at the New
Mexico Law Review's Symposium on State Constitutional Law: "Gomez will be the
permanent legacy of Justice Ransom."' This statement was not made in reference
to the changes in criminal procedure and appellate preservation the opinion
demands, but to the decision to embrace the interstitial methodology. It is a rational,
moderate choice that takes into account judicial administration and political
realities, while giving due deference to both the United States and New Mexico
Constitutions. The interstitial approach permits the court to take advantage of the
large body of law that has developed outside of New Mexico's borders and to
engage in experimentation when deemed necessary. The Gomez court recognized
the efficiency factor involved in utilizing the federal analysis where the individual
right in question was already protected under federal law, thereby avoiding the
C.

56. See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 784, 932 P.2d at 8 (quoting Hunt, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler, J., concurring)).
57. Interview with Scott Davidson, law clerk to Justice Ransom, in Santa Fe, N.M. (1997) (notes on file with

author).
58. See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 783, 932 P.2d at 7.
59. Shaw, supra note 17, at 1025.
60. New Mexico Supreme Court Chief Justice Gene Franchini, Address at the New Mexico Law Review
State Constitutional Law Symposium (November 7,.1997).

Spdng 1998]

STATE V. GOMEZ

necessity of "reinventing the wheel."'" The political considerations underlying the
court's preference for the interstitial approach (as opposed to primacy) include the
fact that the legislature has the authority to reign in the judiciary by amending the
state constitution in such a way as to force the judiciary to decide cases in lock-step
with federal analysis. For example, the Florida legislature, in reaction to an
unpopular judicial decision which granted broader protection under the state
constitution, promulgated and passed a state amendment mandating state conformity
with the federal construction of search and seizure jurisprudence.6 2 The danger is
real because the same bill has been introduced by New Mexico's legislature
(although it failed at the committee level). Moreover, a state judgeship is an elected
position. Thus, the court naturally prefers to have the prestige and authority of the
United63States Supreme Court's analysis to buttress any polemic decision they may
make.
The sagacity of choosing the interstitial approach because it helps to preserve
national uniformity is questionable. First, national uniformity already exists with
regard to minimum protections because the United States Constitution sets the floor
which no state may fall below. Second, striving for and maintaining the preservation
of national uniformity as a worthwhile ideal could arguably impede state
experimentation and inhibit the development of a truly independent and robust body
of state constitutional law. Nevertheless, the interstitial methodology appears to
value both uniformity and diversity. Also, in this mobile age, a profusion of
different standards of protection of basic civil liberties could create confusion for
both officers and individuals alike." Furthermore, New Mexico's choice of the
interstitial approach is in line with historical reality. Unlike New England states, the
United States Constitution preceded New Mexico's state constitution. Thus, the
federal constitution provided the basis for many of our own constitutional
provisions and not the other way around.
Through Gomez, the New Mexico Supreme Court has demonstrated its
receptivity to state constitutional arguments. Thus, competent representation
requires New Mexico practitioners to explore every possible argument under both
federal and state constitutions, even if the textual language is identical. The Gomez
decision also teaches that prosecutors should be wary of arguing that federal
precedent compels a certain conclusion.
To best represent a client, practitioners should attempt to distinguish between the
federal and state arguments and present the state constitutional argument during
every stage of the litigation; for example, in pre-trial motions, at trial, and on
appeal.65 In order to preserve the issue for appellate review, it is particularly
important to give reasons justifying departure from the federal analysis if your
argument has not previously been embraced by New Mexico courts. If there is New
Mexico precedent interpreting the state provision more broadly than its federal

61. Interview with Scott Davidson, former law clerk to Justice Ransom, in Santa Fe, N.M. (1997) (notes
on file with author).
62. See FA. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
63. See Shaw, supra note 17, at 1047-48.
64. See Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 46, at 995.
65. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 19, at 653.
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counterpart, then counsel should be sure to at least make reference to the specific
state provision and the case law or the principle involved, and develop the facts
necessary for a ruling on the issue.6
New Mexico lawyers can play an important role in developing the state's
constitutional jurisprudence by helping the court formulate a principled basis for
repudiating federal precedent. Basing your argument on reasoned factors will help
you convince the court, and help the court convince the public, that the state
constitution supports an outcome at odds with the federal analysis. As a guide to
practitioners, the Gomez court enumerated reasons it has utilized in past cases to
depart from federal precedent.6 7 These reasons include: 1) flawed federal analysis;
2) state characteristics which distinguish New Mexico from the nation as a whole;
and 3) undeveloped federal analogs. 6' However, this list is not meant to be
exclusive. The Gomez opinion has paved the way for innovative constitutional
argumentation by refusing to require practitioners to refer only to criteria specified
by the court as acceptable.' Other state courts have adopted this "specified criteria"
70
approach, promulgated by Justice Handler's concurring opinion in State v. Hunt.
Justice Handler suggested that the following seven reasons could justify a state's
divergence from federal constitutional interpretation: 1) differences in textual
language; 2) legislative history; 3) preexisting state law; 4) structural differences;
5) matters of particular state interest or local concern; 6) state traditions; and 7)
public attitudes.7' It is important to note that, due to Gomez, New Mexico
practitioners are not constrained by this criteria in framing their state constitutional
argument: they are welcome to present more creative justifications. Nevertheless,
litigators would be wise to consult this list and perhaps reference one or more of the
criteria in court, or to analogize their case to one of the above-enumerated reasons
previously utilized by the New Mexico judiciary to justify a divergence from federal
precedent. Although not required, referencing this criteria may give the argument
more weight, and at the very least, consulting this list should help to spark ideas
during the preparation stage.
A strong state constitutional argument can be based on other sources as well. For
instance, reference can be made to federal dissenting opinions or to sister state court
opinions that diverge from federal precedent and provide arguments which seem
more reasonable for New Mexico's situation than the currently prevailing federal
analysis. 72 Also, it may be possible to cite early New Mexico opinions that
demonstrate an independent body of state law was developing in a particular
direction prior to any Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue.73
Justice Ransom has now retired; however, through Gomez, he has left his mark
on the manner in which state constitutional arguments will be argued by

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
at 49-50.
73.

See State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 785-86, 932 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1997).
See id. at 783, 932 P.2d at 7.
See id.
See id. at 784 n.3, 932 P.2d at 8 n.3.
450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
See id. at 965-67 (Handier, J., concurring).
See Phyllis Skloot Bamberger, Boosting Your Case with Your State Constitution, ABA J., Mar. 1, 1986,
See id. at 50.
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practitioners and how they will be decided by the judiciary. New Mexico has
adopted a principled methodology for examining the state constitution. The success
of New Mexico's state constitutionalism may now depend on whether practitioners
will actively participate in developing arguments based on state constitutional
provisions and whether the judiciary will employ the interstitial approach in a
consistent and coherent manner. Prospects appear positive. Recently, in State v.
Vallejos,74 the New Mexico Supreme Court cited Gomez and applied the interstitial
75
method of constitutional analysis to a defendant's state due process claim.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE INTERSTITIAL APPROACH IN
STATE V. GOMEZ
The particular methodology utilized by a court to interpret state constitutional
provisions has a profound effect on the outcome of both procedural and substantive
legal decisions. After adopting the interstitial approach, the Gomez court then
immediately employed that approach to answer two questions raised by the present
case: 1) How to preserve a state constitutional issue on appeal; and 2) Whether
exigent circumstances would be required for warrantless searches of automobiles
in New Mexico. The following analysis will explore these two issues.
A.

Preservationof State ConstitutionalIssue for Appellate Review

1. Background
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, New Mexico's judiciary has ruled
that issues will not be heard on appeal unless a ruling on the issue was fairly
invoked at the trial level. 76 This rule has been codified as Rule 12-216(A) in New
Mexico's Rules of Appellate Procedure, and it serves the double objectives of
promoting fairness and judicial efficiency. Central to the idea of justice is that all
parties to a controversy should have the opportunity to present evidence and
arguments that bear on the opposing side's contentions. Efficiency requires that this
development of facts and argument be done at the trial level alone. If otherwise,
district judges could not make appropriate rulings because they would not be alerted
to the substance of particular arguments and each stage in the appellate process
could potentially result in a new trial. Under Rule 12-216(B), if a ruling on an issue
is not "fairly invoked" at the trial level, the appellate system will consider the
contention only if it consists of a jurisdictional question, or if it involves a question
77
of general public interest, fundamental error or a party's rights.
A question that has plagued the courts and litigating parties alike is: What type
of argument constitutes "fairly invoked"? In making a freedom of speech claim, the
defendant in State v. Ongley7 s cited to the relevant sections of both the United States

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
(1997).

123 N.M. 739, 945 P.2d 957 (1997).
See id. at 749, 945 P.2d at 967.
See Fullen v. Fullen, 21 N.M. 212, 225, 153 P. 294, 297 (1915). See also N.M. R. APP. P. 12-216(A).
See N.M. R. APP. P. 12-216(B).
118 N.M. 431, 882 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1994), modified by State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1
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and New Mexico constitutions; nevertheless, the appellate court refused to review
the issue because the defendant "did not specifically argue below that the New
Mexico Constitution provided a broader degree of protection than the United States
Constitution. .. ."" The court opined that specific argument was needed in order
to alert the trial judge that a different level of protection may be involved. 0 In a
similar vein, the court of appeals held a year later that general reference to the state
constitution as a document more protective of individual rights than the federal
constitution did not preserve a defendant's specific claim on appeal that an
informant's reliability is more critically examined under New Mexico law than
federal law. 8 Although counsel for the defendant did cross-examine the arresting
officer regarding the informant's credibility, the issue was not pressed after the
officer invoked privilege. 2 This strict standard requiring specificity for preserving
a state constitutional claim for appellate review was the governing interpretation of
Rule 12-216(A) at the time the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Gomez.
2. Gomez Preservation Rule
Before the Gomez court could decide the substantive issue of whether the New
Mexico Constitution requires a showing of exigent circumstances to justify
warrantless searches of automobiles and containers found within, the court had to
examine the procedural question regarding whether Gomez had properly preserved
that particular issue for appeal. The New Mexico Court of Appeals refused to
examine Gomez's state constitutional claim. 3 According to the appellate court,
Gomez had not met the burden, as set forth in Rule 12-216(A)84 and explicated in
State v. De Jesus-Santibafez,5 for preserving an issue for appellate review. 6 In
backing up its ruling, the court of appeals stated that Gomez' s argument at the trial
level "not only failed to articulate why the New Mexico Constitution affords greater
protection under these circumstances, but failed to even mention the state
constitution." 7 This statement perhaps represents an oversight of the appellate court
because Gomez clearly invoked Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution in his Motion to Suppress, which was submitted and argued before the
trial court. 8

79. Id. at 432, 882 P.2d at 23.
80. See id.
81. See State v. De Jesus-Santibafiez, 119 N.M. 578, 580, 893 P.2d 474, 476 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 119
N.M. 464, 891 P.2d 1218 (1995).
82. See id.
83. See State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777,781,932 P.2d 1, 5 (1997).
84. N.M. R. App. P. 12-216(A).
85. 119 N.M. 578, 580,893 P.2d 474,476 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 119 N.M. 464, 891 P.2d 1218 (1995)
(defendant invoked broader protection argument at trial level but issue was not properly preserved for appeal
because defendant failed to advance specific argument on appeal).
86. See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 781, 932 P.2d at 5.
87. Id.
88. See Defendant's Motion to Suppress at 2, Gomez, (No. 94-299),asserting: "Evidence obtained from
Alfredo Gomez's car-including the closed container-should be suppressed as the fruits of an arrest and search

violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Section 10, Article 11of the New Mexico
Constitution." Id.
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While setting straight the appellate court's misstatement of fact, 9 the New
Mexico Supreme Court established a new test for state courts to employ in
determining whether a constitutional claim has been properly preserved.9 The new
test is a refinement of previously applied requirements as set forth in State v. De
Jesus-Santibaiez.9' When a party requests a form of protection that has already
been recognized under New Mexico precedent, the court construes Rule 12-216(A)
to require that the party: 1) assert the constitutional principle; and 2) show a factual
basis complete enough for the trial court to rule on the issue. 92 If there is no New
Mexico precedential case law supportive of the right to the protection requested, the
party must specifically assert the reasons why New Mexico should now interpret the
state provision more broadly than its federal counterpart, in addition to fulfilling
steps one and two above. 93 This predicate is sufficient to alert both the trial court
and the opposing party to the constitutional claim, and thus satisfies the mandate of
Rule 12-216(A) that reviewing courts only consider questions raised in the lower
court.

The court in Gomez held that the defendant met the requirements of Rule 12216(A) as established in its new test. 9" The defendant had invoked the New Mexico
Constitution in his motion to suppress, and, at trial, he implicitly asserted the
exigent circumstances principle by referring to State v. Coleman." Furthermore, he
met part two of the test because Deputy Payne testified to the circumstances
surrounding the search, thus establishing enough of a factual basis to permit the
court to rule on whether the exigencies of the situation required a warrantless
search. 96 Since there is established precedent interpreting Article II, Section 10 of
the New Mexico Constitution more broadly than the Fourth Amendment, the
defendant in Gomez did not need to cite to specific cases nor brief reasons why New
Mexico should diverge from federal law in this area. 7 The Gomez court rejected the
State's argument that litigants must cite to the specific cases which broadly construe
the state constitutional provision at issue by stating:
Where New Mexico courts have taken a different path than federal courts, our
precedent governs regardless of whether a party cites specific cases in support
of a constitutional principle, so long as the party has asserted the principle
recognized in the cases and has developed the facts adequately to give the
opposing party an opportunity to respond and to give the court an opportunity
to rule. 98

In reaching its decision, the court explicitly acknowledged the differences
between trial and appellate practice that make it impracticable to require litigators

89.
90.
91.
92.

See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 784,932 P.2d at 8.
See id. at 785, 932 P.2d at 9.
119 N.M. 578, 580-81, 893 P.2d 474,476-77, cert denied, 119 N.M. 464, 891 P.2d 1218 (1995).
See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 784, 932 P.2d at 8.

93. See id.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See id. at 784-85, 932 P.2d at 8-9.
87 N.M. 153, 530 P.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1974).
See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 785, 932 P.2d at 9.
See id. at 784, 932 P.2d at 8.
Id. at 785-86, 932 P.2d at 9-10.
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to fully brief state constitutional arguments at the trial level.99 Furthermore, the
court recognized that preservation of state constitutional issues should not be
subject to a higher standard than are federal constitutional issues." The approach
employed by the court of appeals in the past made it difficult to raise issues on
appeal. Through Gomez, the New Mexico Supreme Court has facilitated its ability
to hear important state constitutional claims.
3. Analysis and Implications
The Gomez ruling on preserving an issue for appellate review constitutes a
needed clarification of New Mexico's preservation law and facilitates an expansion
of state constitutional jurisprudence. The test for preserving an issue for appellate
review formulated by the Gomez opinion refines and clarifies previous
requirements."°1 The New Mexico Supreme Court has appropriately ruled that
preserving a state constitutional claim demands no more effort than what is required
to preserve a federal constitutional claim."° In effect, the Gomez opinion advises
the court of appeals that a more generous standard should be applied to the
determination of whether the court should hear particular issues. The Gomez rule
recognizes the differences between trial and appellate practice and the difficulty of
fully preparing a state constitutional claim before trial. °3 If the State had prevailed,
practitioners would be forced to either engage in in-depth research and explication
of state constitutional claims at the trial level or abandon issues that could have
forcefully impacted a client's case and the development of New Mexico's
constitutional jurisprudence.
After Gomez, there are certain steps practitioners must take to ensure potential
state constitutional claims will be preserved for appellate review. The threshold
question to address is whether there is New Mexico precedent construing the state
constitutional provision as providing broader protection than its federal analog.""
If so, counsel must be sure to, at a minimum, invoke the constitutional principle at
issue. Specific cases need not be cited;' however, mentioning cases will aid the
trial court in reaching a speedier and more thorough decision. It can also help
buttress the substantive argument and further insulate the issue from attacks
questioning its proper preservation at the appellate level. A second necessary step
is for counsel to adequately develop the facts in order to give the opposing party a
°6
chance to respond and the trial court the opportunity to rule on the issue'
On the other hand, if the state constitutional claim being asserted is a novel one
(i.e. the provision in question has not previously been interpreted as furnishing more
protection than its federal counterpart), additional steps must be taken to ensure the

99. See id. at 786,932 P.2d at 10.
100. See id.
101. Seeid. at786,932P.2dat 10.
102. See id. at 781-82, 932 P.2d at 5-6.
103. See id. at 786, 932 P.2d at 10.
104. See id. at 784, 932 P.2d at 8 (stating that "therequirements for preserving the claim for appeflate review
depend on current New Mexico precedent construing that state constitutional provision").
105. See id. at 785-86, 932 P.2d at 9-10 (holding that a party need only assert the principle involved when
New Mexico precedent diverges from the federal approach).
106. See id.
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issue will be preserved for appellate review. At the trial level, besides developing
the factual predicate, counsel must argue for a broader reading of the right under the
New Mexico Constitution and provide reasons justifying the requested expansion
of the right."° In other words, if New Mexico has traditionally construed a state
constitutional provision in line with the federal interpretation of an analogous
provision under the United States Constitution, counsel must coherently explain
why New Mexico should now depart from that federal construction.
B.

Search and Seizure Law

1. Historical Background of the Automobile Exception
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution imposes a warrant
requirement'0 8 in order to safeguard individual privacy from overly-intrusive
governmental actions. Over the years, a few well-defined exceptions to the warrant
requirement have developed in recognition of the practical realities of law
enforcement in modern-day America. The automobile exception has its roots in
Carrollv. United States," 9 a 1925 case which authorized warrantless searches of
automobiles when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
contraband." 0 The Court in Carrollreviewed congressional legislation and noted
that historically the Fourth Amendment has been construed
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling
house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily
may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought."'
Nevertheless, it did not necessarily follow that this exception applied equally to
closed containers, such as luggage, found inside the automobile. In United States
v. Chadwick,"' the Supreme Court ruled that a warrantless search of a footlocker
was not justified simply because it was located within a vehicle." 3 The Court
rejected the extension of the automobile exception of the general warrant
requirement to closed packages and containers found within the vehicle." 4 This

107. See id. at 784, 932 P.2d at 8.
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("le right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
109. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The CarrollCourt upheld a warrantless search of an automobile suspected of
carrying liquor during the prohibition era. See id. at 153. The decision was based on the inherent mobility of
automobiles and the impracticability of awaiting a warrant when the occupants were not under arrest. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
113. See id at 13. The Court, however, did acknowledge that generally there is a diminished expectation of
privacy in vehicles because an auto's main function is transportation and an auto does not normally serve as a
residence. See id. at 12.
114. See id. at 13. There is a higher expectation of privacy in containers such as footlockers because a
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principle was reaffirmed in Arkansas v. Sanders"' and Robbins v. California."16
However, the Court shifted course in United States v. Ross."7 In Ross, the Court
held that the scope of the automobile exception may permissibly extend to cover
searches of closed containers found within a vehicle if there is probable cause to
believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within."' Finally, in Californiav.
Acevedo," 9 the Supreme Court concluded "that it is better to adopt one clear-cut
rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed
containers set forth in Sanders.""
Twenty-three years ago, in State v. Coleman,' the New Mexico Court of
Appeals held that a showing of probable cause, combined with exigent
circumstances, provides the requisite foundation for a warrantless search of a closed
burlap sack located inside a vehicle.' Although the court found that the officers
had probable cause to believe that the defendant's car contained marijuana, exigent
circumstances did not exist because the car was parked outside the Sheriff's office
when the search took place and the car's occupants had been placed under arrest.'
Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's suppression of the evidence pertaining to
marijuana found within the burlap sack. 2 This case did not diverge from the
federal view prevalent at the time, which refused to create a blanket exception to the
warrant requirement for closed containers found within automobiles. The Coleman
court recognized that under some circumstances a warrantless search of a vehicle's
containers may be constitutionally justified; however, the State must meet the
requirements of the two-part probable cause and exigent circumstances test. 5
However, when the New Mexico Supreme Court heard argument in State v.
Pena"6 in 1989, the federal system had by then decided Ross.'27 Ross held that a
search of the contents of a vehicle, including closed containers, only required
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband.2 8 The Ross Court
made no mention of an "exigent circumstances" requirement. Pena ignored

footlocker is "not open to public view" and is intended as a "repository of personal effects." See id.
115. 442 U.S. 753, 763 (1979) (holding that warrantless search of suitcase found in trunk of vehicle was
impermissible under the Fourth Amendment; the rationale being that the luggage itself is not mobile if removed

from the automobile).
116. 453 U.S. 420,425-27 (1981) (holding that warrantless search of opaque plastic package in car was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment; all containers are equally protected by the Constitution unless their contents
are in plain view).
117. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
118. See id at 825 ("If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search
of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search."). The Ross decision did not
overrule Arkansas v. Sanders; rather, it limited Sanders to requiring a warrant when there is probable cause to

search the particular container, but not requiring one when there is probable cause to search the entire vehicle. See
id.
at 824.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

500 U.S. 565 (1991).
Id. at 579.
87 N.M. 153, 530 P.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1974).
See id. at 154, 530 P.2d at 948.
See id. at 155, 530 P.2d at 949.
See id.
See id.at 154, 530 P.2d at 948.
108 N.M. 760, 779 P.2d 538 (1989).
Ross was decided in 1982. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
See id.at 825.
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Coleman's exigent circumstances requirement and instead decided in lock-step 9
with the federal principle established in Ross. Pena held that discovery of a roach
clip with marijuana residue in the ashtray of defendant's car gave a police officer
probable cause that justified a warrantless search of the vehicle's interior, including
a brown bag found within, under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.' 3" In accordance with traditional lock-step analysis, the Pena Court
only discussed the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and the federal Ross precedent. The Pena court did not
undertake an independent analysis of the protection afforded by Article II, Section
10 of the New Mexico Constitution.
However, in State v. Cordova' (a case decided the same year as Pena),the New
Mexico Supreme Court finally diverged from the lock-step approach both
theoretically and in practice by rejecting the notion that federal precedent should
always serve as a guide in interpreting the New Mexico Constitution.' 3 2 In
interpreting the New Mexico Constitution independently of the federal construction
of an analogous United States constitutional provision, the Cordova court
underscored its reliance on local conditions as opposed to the national situation by
stating: "Our holding today ... reflects our close acquaintance with the problems
and traditions of our state. By necessity, we33are better acquainted with these factors
than is the United States Supreme Court."'
Despite finding that the New Mexico Constitution on occasion may afford
greater protection to individual rights than its federal counterpart, New Mexico
continued to interpret its search and seizure provision in line with Ross, which does
not require a showing of exigent circumstances in addition to probable cause with
respect to warrantless searches of containers found within automobiles."3 Then, in
1994, the New Mexico Supreme Court departed from federal precedent in the realm
of searches and seizures. 35 In Campos v. State, the court held that "for a warrantless
arrest to be reasonable, it must be based upon both probable cause and sufficient
exigent circumstances."'' 36 In contrast, the federal rule establishes that warrantless
arrests based on probable cause alone are constitutionally permissible. 37 In
justifying its adoption of more expansive protection, the New Mexico Supreme
Court followed the interstitial approach to state constitutional analysis without
explicitly saying it was doing so. The court in Campos first examined federal
precedent. After finding that federal law did not help the petitioner, it looked to
prior New Mexico decisions which exhibited New Mexico's strong preference for

129. See discussion supra Part mI.A.I for an explanation of the lock-step method of state constitutional
interpretation.
130. See Pena, 108 N.M. at 761, 779 P.2d at 539.
131. 109 N.M. 211,784 P.2d 30(1989).
132. See id. at 217,784 P.2d at 36 (rejecting the federal "totality-of-circumstances" test in favor of a two-part
test requiring a showing of basis of knowledge and credibility in regard to the amount of information that must be
supplied in an application for a search warrant).
133. Id. at 216, 784 P.2d at 35 n.8.
134. See State v. Apodaca, 112 N.M. 302, 814 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App. 1991) (where officer had probable cause

to search entire vehicle, warrantless search of suitcase found in trunk was lawful).
135. See Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994).
136. See id. at 156, 870 P.2d at 118.
137. See id. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120 (referring to United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976)).
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a warrant. 3 In addition, the court exhibited its distaste for bright-line rules by
holding that: "In light of these decisions, we must decline to adopt the blanket
federal rule that all warrantless arrests of felons based on probable cause are
constitutionally permissible in public places. We do this because we believe that
each case must be reviewed in light of its own facts and circumstances." '39
2. The Gomez Court's Adoption of the Exigent Circumstances Requirement
After officially adopting the interstitial methodology, the New Mexico Supreme
Court then applied that approach to the facts in Gomez in order to answer the
substantive question of whether, contrary to federal precedent, New Mexico law
requires exigent circumstances before a warrantless search of an automobile and its
containers could be deemed valid.14 As mentioned earlier, the court of appeals did
not address this question because it ruled that the substantive issue had not been
properly preserved. The New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that under4
federal law an officer may conduct an automobile search on probable cause alone. 1
Since federal law did not provide the protection requested by Gomez, the court was
obliged, consistent with the interstitial method, to consider the constitutional
implications of the issue under state law. In arriving at its holding that "a
warrantless search of an automobile and its contents requires a particularized
showing of exigent circumstances,' 1 42 the New Mexico Supreme Court explicitly
1 43
rejected both the federal rationale and state law relying on the federal precedent.
As required by the interstitial approach, the New Mexico Supreme Court first
examined federal law. It found that the Supreme Court has carved out a bright-line
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement which also
encompasses closed containers found within automobiles. 1" The Supreme Court has
articulated two primary reasons for creating the automobile exception: the belief
that exigent circumstances always exist because automobiles are inherently
mobile;145 and the belief that individuals have a lesser expectation of privacy in their
automobiles than in their homes due to the existence of "pervasive" vehicle
regulation.'"
In Gomez, prosecutors based their argument primarily upon State v. Pena,47 a
case which accepted the federal viewpoint and held that in New Mexico warrantless
searches of automobiles were justified on the basis of probable cause alone. 14' The
New Mexico Supreme Court did not grant much weight to this argument because
the Pena decision came down when the court was still treating Article HI, Section

138. See id. at 159, 870 P.2d at 121.
139. Id. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120.
140. See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 786, 932 P.2d at 10.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 788, 932 P.2d at 12.
143. See id. at 787-88, 932 P.2d at I 1-12.
144. See id. at 786, 932 P.2d at 10 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,575-76 (1991); United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982)).
145. See id. at 787, 932 P.2d at 11 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1970)).
146. See id. (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985)).
147. 108 N.M. 760, 779 P.2d 538 (1989).
148. See id. at 762, 779 P.2d at 540.
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10 of the New Mexico Constitution as analogous to the federal Fourth Amendment. 49 Although lock-step had been intellectually discarded by State ex rel. Serna
v. Hodges, that decision had no practical effect on subsequent cases, such as Pena,
because the judiciary continued to interpret state analogs of federal provisions as
having identical meaning; it was not truly engaging in independent analysis of state
constitutional provisions. Since the Gomez court committed itself to the interstitial
approach, it did not see itself bound by a case which blindly followed federal
precedent without taking the next step of independently interpreting whether New
Mexico law affords broader protection. Thus, the State's reliance on Pena was
misplaced because the court opined that Pena was not controlling precedent."
The Gomez court concluded that New Mexico affords broader protection of
individual rights than the United States Constitution in the realm of search and
seizure law. It reached this watershed decision by examining the warrant
requirement. First, the court recognized the "strong preference for warrants""' in
New Mexico and looked at the practical implications of the requirement. The State
tried to support its reliance on Pena with the argument that the citizen does not
benefit from the warrant requirement when there is probable cause because the
governmental intrusion is perhaps greater when both the individual and car are
detained while officers attempt to secure a warrant.'52 The logic supporting this
argument is that if there is probable cause, a warrant will be forthcoming and a
search inevitable. Therefore, the argument continues, it could be considered more
intrusive to subject individuals, particularly innocent ones, to a lengthy waiting
period when an on-the-scene check could be conducted. However, the weakness of
this argument is that it puts the determination of probable cause into the hands of
the officer, rather than a neutral magistrate. Thus, the Gomez court rejected the
State's argument, and, instead, emphasized the vital role played by neutral
magistrates in protecting the public from exposure to potentially unreasonable
searches and seizures carried out by overzealous officers who may compromise
their judgment in their eagerness to fight crime by effecting an immediate arrest."'
In support of its decision, the court cited arguments in favor of the warrant
requirement propounded by the Supreme Court in United States v. Chadwick."4 In
Chadwick, the Supreme Court emphasized that the warrant requirement safeguards
the public against improper searches; provides an assurance of propriety; and limits
the bounds of the search to those deemed justified by a magistrate exercising
detached scrutiny over the matter.'55
Moreover, the Gomez court opined that there was no valid justification behind
the bright-line exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles, or for closed

149. See Gomez. 122 N.M. at 787,932 P.2d at 11 (stating "[i]n
Pena, we treated the two search and seizure
provisions interchangeably and in effect regarded Fourth Amendment precedent as binding on us in interpreting
Article ILSection 10.").
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 787-88, 932 P.2d at 11-12.
154. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
155. See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 787, 932 P.2d at 11 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 9).
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containers found within automobiles, created by federal precedent. 5 6 While
acknowledging that exigent circumstances may surround most searches of vehicles,
the New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed with the federal reasoning that the
mobile nature of automobiles creates exigent circumstances in every case. 5 7 The
court recognized that, under certain fact patterns, there may be "no reasonable basis
for believing an automobile will be moved or its search will otherwise be
compromised by delay"'; in those situations exhibiting a lack of exigency, a
warrant is required. The court further justified its divergence by implying that the
United States Supreme Court seems to be distancing itself from its own precedent.
The blanket automobile exception contradicts the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncement in Ohio v. Robinette'59 that the Court eschews bright-line rules
because they do not take into account the innumerable variations in circumstances.' 60 The Gomez opinion responds to this federal inconsistency by stating:
'6
"We regard the automobile exception as a failure to recognize such variations."' '
Thus, the Gomez court reached its decision to depart from federal precedent by
focusing on New Mexico's preference for warrants; by concluding that the federal
reasoning is flawed; and by insinuating that there may be a future federal reversal.
After adopting the principle of exigency, the New Mexico Supreme Court then
declared that a reasonableness standard will be applied to cases to determine
whether the officer acted appropriately in conducting a warrantless search of an
automobile. 62 The Gomez court held that "[w]here the officer has an objectively
reasonable basis for believing exigent circumstances require an immediate
warrantless search, then the search is valid."'6 a The court made clear that exigent
circumstances included reason to believe that evidence will be destroyed if the
officer waits to secure a warrant.' In addition, if reasonable minds could differ, the
court proclaimed that due deference should be granted the officer's judgment. 65
Applying this standard to the facts of the present case, the Gomez court noted that
it was late at night and numerous party-goers surrounded the defendant's car."
Deputy Payne testified that he believed the car would have been removed, or the
evidence destroyed, if he had waited for a warrant. 6 7 Also, Payne felt that other
options were closed off to him: confiscating the car keys may not have deterred a
potentially rowdy crowd; and, due to the late hour, the wait for a tow-truck to arrive
on the scene may have been lengthy.' 6' Therefore, the Gomez court found that it was
reasonable for Deputy Payne to conclude that exigent circumstances necessitated

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See id. at 789, 932 P.2d at 13.
See id.
Id.
117 S.Ct. 417 (1996).
See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 789, 932 P.2d at 13 (quoting Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421).
Id.
See id. at 788, 932 P.2d at 12.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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an immediate warrantless search of Gomez's vehicle.' 69 Thus, the court's holding
that warrantless searches of automobiles and of containers found within require a
showing of exigent circumstances ultimately constituted no reprieve for defendant
Gomez.
3. Analysis and Implications
After Gomez, in the state of New Mexico, a warrantless search of an automobile
and containers found within requires an objectively reasonable showing of exigent
circumstances; whereas nationally, a simple showing of probable cause to search
will suffice. 70 The Gomez decision clearly reveals that the New Mexico judiciary
is intent upon fully exploring and developing an independent state jurisprudence in
the arena of individual civil liberties, particularly in regard to protection against
unreasonable search and seizure. This is not a new notion that suddenly struck the
fancy of the court; rather, Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution has
been independently interpreted to afford broader protection than what is nationally
7
required in various cases over the last seven years.' ' For example, New Mexico had
already exhibited a tendency to guard against incursions into the warrant
requirement in Campos v. State,' 72 a case which held that exigent circumstances
173
were required to justify warrantless arrests in public places. The Gomez court's
rejection of the federal bright-line automobile exception to the warrant requirement
is in line with the court's pronouncement that the interpretation of a state
constitutional provision will not simply mirror that of its federal analogue if the
74
federal analysis is deemed flawed or unpersuasive.1 In this case, New Mexico
appropriately diverges from the federal interpretation because the bright-line auto
exception fails to recognize factual variations. Exigent circumstances are not
inherent to every search involving automobiles. Not every vehicle is mobile, and
those that are can almost always be disabled by confiscating the keys or impounding
the vehicle until a warrant is issued.
Furthermore, the federal expansion of the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement to include closed containers found within goes far beyond the original
purpose of the exception with little reasoned analysis. Closed containers are
certainly not inherently mobile; moreover, containers are utilized as a repository of
personal effects, thus a higher expectation of privacy attaches to the contents of
containers (particularly those which are closed and opaque.) Since a requirement
of exigent circumstances sensibly protects privacy rights and the integrity of the
warrant requirement, and since it appears that the Supreme Court is attempting to
move away from bright-line rules,'75 perhaps the Gomez opinion will one day play

169. See id.
170. See id. at 786-88, 932 P.2d at 10-12.
171. See New Mexico Supreme Court Chief Justice Gene Franchini, Address at the New Mexico Law Review
State Constitutional Law Symposium (November 7, 1997) (notes on file with author). See also Gomez, 122 N.M.
at 788, 932 P.2d at 12.
172. 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994).
173. See id. at 158, 870 P.2d at 120.
174. See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 783, 932 P.2d at 7.
175. See id. at 789,932 P.2d at 13 (referring to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Ohio v. Robinette,
117 S.Ct. 417, 421 (1996), that it "expressly disavow[s] any 'litmus-paper test'... in recognition of the 'endless
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a role in provoking a future reversal of the federal bright-line automobile and
container exception.
Surprisingly, an individual's expectation of privacy did not seem to play a role
in the Gomez court's decision-making process. It is unfortunate that the Gomez
opinion does not distinguish between searches of automobiles and searches of
closed containers within automobiles. It would be rational to require a higher
showing of exigency in order to justify warrantless searches of closed containers
(although any absolute rule requiring a warrant in every case would probably go too
far in undermining officer safety and ability to appropriately respond under
particularly stressful conditions). In addition, the court could have also justified its
departure from federal precedent by referring to the expectation of privacy standard
in the context of distinctive state characteristics. For instance, the Gomez decision
could have been based upon a recognition of the poverty which afflicts New Mexico
and the reality that many vehicles within the state are propped up on blocks and
utilized as homes.
The Gomez opinion should provoke questions within New Mexico's legal
community such as: Is the application of the newly stated exigent circumstances
rule too deferential to officers? Does the opinion grant broader protection only in
theory? The Gomez court may have weakened its own rule by finding that Deputy
Payne was reasonable in believing that exigencies existed even when the vehicle
owner had been placed under arrest and police were able to watch the car until a
tow-truck arrived. 176 Nevertheless, the court exhibited its own leanings when it
mentioned in dicta that impoundment perhaps would have been preferable to a
warrantless search. 177 Thus, New Mexico practitioners faced with a similar case
should be prepared to explain to the court why impoundment was or was not
(depending on whether you represent the prosecution or the defense) a viable
option. Due to the narrow application of the exigent circumstances rule in Gomez,
the case may have little effect on how future police investigatory operations are
conducted. However, in preparing for trial, counsel on both sides should be aware
that officers must be able to articulate specific reasons why they believed it
necessary to proceed with a warrantless search.
V. CONCLUSION
State v. Gomez is a significant case for New Mexico practitioners for both its
substantive and procedural pronouncements. In the area of criminal law, the Gomez
decision requires the State to prove the existence of exigent circumstances any time
a warrantless search is conducted of vehicles, and of containers found within, before
it may utilize the evidence obtained in a court of law. The warrant requirement
under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution is thus more stringently
17

variations in the facts and circumstances' implicating the Fourth Amendment").
176.

See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 788, 932 P.2d at 12.

177. See id. The New Mexico Supreme Court specifically stated: "It would have been reasonable--and
perhaps preferable-for Deputy Payne to have refrained from searching the vehicle and closed containers within
it until after it was impounded, at which point he could have obtained a warrant. This course of action would have
shown more deference to the warrant process." Id.
178.

122 N.M. 777,932 P.2d 1(1997).
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applied against law enforcement in order to protect individual rights than is its
parallel provision in the federal system--the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. In arriving at this expansive view of the New Mexico
Constitution, the court formally adopted the interstitial method of state
constitutional interpretation as the theoretical approach of choice in New Mexico.
By doing so, the Gomez court has demonstrated the vitality of the New Mexico
Constitution as a tool for safeguarding individual rights. In analyzing a
constitutional issue, the judiciary will first examine federal precedent; if it finds the
federal analysis unpersuasive, broader protection of civil liberties may be granted
based on the New Mexico Constitution. The practical consequences of relying
solely on federal law could be devastating for litigators and their clients. When
asserting or denying a constitutional claim, litigators must invoke both federal and
state constitutions and learn how to make effective arguments under each. If you do
not prevail on your state constitutional claim at trial, the Gomez decision makes
preserving the issue for appellate review less daunting. Gomez illustrates how New
Mexico state constitutional jurisprudence is rapidly expanding: Here's your chance
to partake in its development.
JENNIFER CUTCLIFFE JUSTE

